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I. INTRODUCTION
The second impeachment of President Donald J. Trump raised an
important and unresolved question: May Presidents and other federal
officers be impeached or tried on impeachments after they have left office?
Most Democrats argued that former officers can be both impeached and
tried; most Republicans argued that former officers can neither be
impeached nor tried. Trump himself was impeached while still in office
and tried – and acquitted – after he left office. This is the sort of question
that could easily arise again, in connection with presidents and other
officers of either party, and it needs an answer that does not shift with
every gust of partisan wind. As Alexander Hamilton warned in The
Federalist, No. 65, impeachment proceedings “will seldom fail to agitate
the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties, more or
less friendly or inimical, to the accused,” and thus there is “always the
greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strengths of parties” than the merits of the case.1 It is not wise
to wait until the heat of the moment to think about these things, or allow
structural issues of this sort to be resolved on the basis of case-by-case
judgments, which will be heavily influenced by the very passions
Hamilton warned against. 2
The Trump impeachment is not the only time these questions have
arisen in recent decades. In the final hours of his second term, President
William J. Clinton issued a series of presidential pardons that, to many
observers of both political parties, were highly problematic if not out-andout corrupt.3 Senator Arlen Specter, a liberal Republican from
Pennsylvania who had voted against convicting Clinton on his prior
impeachment – and who later switched parties and became a Democrat –

1

THE FEDERALIST, NO. 65, at 396–97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
2
By far the most comprehensive and insightful academic analysis is Professor
Brian Kalt’s 2001 article, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former
Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment,
6 Tex. Rev. of L. & Pol. 13 (2001). A shorter version appears in Chapter 5 of his book,
CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR
ENEMIES (Yale Univ. Press 2012). This article relies heavily on Kalt’s research and
analysis, though ultimately disagreeing with his conclusion about late impeachment.
Other sources that discuss impeachment of former officers include MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 81–83 (3rd ed. 2019); Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 255, 277 (1973); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional
Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L.J. 707, 714–18 (1988).
3
See Pardons Granted By President William J. Clinton (1993–2001), THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardonsgranted-president-william-j-clinton-1993-2001 [https://perma.cc/U7B4-6RTC].
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suggested impeaching the ex-President.4 There also were rumblings about
a post-presidential impeachment of President George W. Bush for alleged
wrongdoing in connection with the treatment of enemy combatants.5 The
issue does not often arise because there is usually little appetite for
impeachment after an officer no longer wields power. Richard Nixon
avoided impeachment by a timely resignation, but a different Congress
might have made the opposite decision: to continue the impeachment
process as a deterrent to future presidential misconduct. We cannot
assume that the issue will never arise.
In this Article I will argue that both sides in the debate over the Trump
impeachment were half right: Only sitting officers may be impeached, but
the Senate may try any procedurally proper impeachment even if the
officer has left office in the interval between impeachment and trial.
Donald Trump’s second impeachment trial was therefore entirely
legitimate in this respect, because the House passed its Resolution of
Impeachment on January 13, 2021, six days before the end of his term,6
though his trial in the Senate did not begin until February 9.
There is no persuasive argument that the Senate lacks power to try a
timely impeachment after the person impeached has left office. Article I
states plainly that the Senate has power to try “all impeachments,” and
there is no textual basis for an exception in the case of former officers.
Although an ex-officer can no longer suffer the mandatory punishment of
removal, conviction may still bring the discretionary punishment of
disqualification from future office; thus, the trial and conviction of an exofficer carries meaningful consequence. Congressional practice in the
centuries since adoption of the Constitution is entirely consistent with this
plain meaning interpretation. Although the Senate usually declines to
proceed with a removal proceeding after an officer has resigned, it has
made clear this is a matter of discretion and not lack of authority. The
arguments proffered by then-former President Trump’s lawyers and
4
See Carl Hulse and Adam Nagourney, Specter Switches Parties; More Heft for
Democrats, N.Y. Times (April 28, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/
2009/04/29/us/politics/29specter.html [https://perma.cc/HE5N-USAD]; see also
Arlen Specter Votes ‘Not Proved’, AP News (Feb. 12, 1999), https://apnews.com/
article/dcb0cc63a679b323b206845b40703baf [https://perma.cc/5J8P-3MAV].
5
See H.R.J Res. 1258, 110th Cong. (2008) (Articles of impeachment introduced
and sponsored by Congressman Dennis Kucinich and Robert Wexler against Bush.
The House of Representatives 251 to 166 to refer the impeachment resolution to the
Judiciary Committee on June 11, 2008, where no further action was taken on it.).
6
Some have argued that the decisive date for impeachment is not passage of the
impeachment resolution, but official transmission of the articles of impeachment to
the Senate, which occurred after Mr. Trump left office. See Jeremy Herb and Manu
Raju, Manu, House delivers impeachment article to Senate, CNN Politics (January 25,
2021, 8:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/25/politics/impeachment-articlesenate-house/index.html [https://perma.cc/7FSK-KN9S]. This argument will be
further considered at infra Part II.
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supporters in 2021 were based on the impropriety of impeachments years
after the officer had departed from public life, not trials of persons
impeached while still in office.
The argument against impeachment of former officers is a slightly
closer question, but it also finds a clear answer in the constitutional text.
Article II provides for impeachment of “the President, the Vice President,
and other civil officers.” To read this provision as allowing impeachment
of ex-officers requires either that we interpret the term “civil officers” as
embracing former officers, which is not what those words ordinarily mean,
or that we treat the list of impeachable persons as non-exclusive, which
would have extraordinary consequences inconsistent with both the
drafting history and the weight of subsequent practice.
To be sure, supporters of late impeachment offer a powerful
functionalist justification: that late impeachment is necessary to deter
misconduct in the final days and hours of a presidency. But opponents of
late impeachment have a similarly powerful functionalist counterpoint:
that former officers should not be subject to the political harassment of
impeachment for the rest of their lives. When functionalist arguments cut
both ways, as they often do, it is best to interpret the Constitution
according to its text, structure, and history. The question, we should
remember, is not what we think would be a good system but what the
Constitution actually means. One value of a written Constitution is that it
provides a rulebook for resolution of issues that would likely provoke
partisan division if decided on the basis of intuitions about good
constitutional policy in a particular case.
There is an especially strong functionalist argument for allowing an
impeachment proceeding to continue when, like Richard Nixon, the
officer resigns to prevent impeachment from taking place. On one
occasion in 1876, discussed in greater detail below, the Senate conducted
a trial on an impeachment of a cabinet secretary under just those
circumstances.7 That case involved a cabinet officer, Secretary of War
Belknap, who resigned just hours before the House voted to impeach him,
specifically to avoid the embarrassment. In the Senate, Belknap’s defense
was based almost entirely on the fact that he was no longer an officer at
the time of impeachment. There were two votes on the issue. At the
beginning of trial, there was a motion to dismiss, which required a majority
vote and was defeated. At the close of trial Belknap was acquitted for lack
of a two-thirds vote, largely on the ground that impeachment of an exofficer is not authorized by the Constitution. In any event, post-resignation
impeachment is an arguably special case. A principle of equity holds that
a party to a legal proceeding cannot defeat jurisdiction by his own
7
The details are discussed below at infra Part III.C. Some commentators regard
the impeachment of Senator William Blount as a late impeachment, but that is not
accurate. That case is also discussed below at infra Part III.C.
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unilateral actions, such as mooting the case. Especially given its
ambiguous outcome, this single incident of a post-resignation
impeachment is insufficient to warrant a general rule that former officers
are impeachable after they have left office.

II. MAY THE SENATE TRY AN EX-OFFICER ON AN IMPEACHMENT
THAT WAS RENDERED WHILE THE OFFICER WAS STILL IN OFFICE?
Forty-five senators voted to dismiss the second Trump impeachment
before trial, on a point of order.8 The point of order, raised by Senator
Rand Paul, was worded as follows: “that this proceeding, which would try
a private citizen and not a President, a Vice President, or civil officer,
violates the Constitution and is not in order.”9 Quoting Article II, Section
4 and the second sentence of Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, Senator Paul
explained the basis for his motion: “As of noon last Wednesday, Donald
Trump holds none of the positions listed in the Constitution. He is a
private citizen. The Presiding Officer is not the Chief Justice, nor does he
claim to be. His presence in the Chief Justice’s absence demonstrates that
this is not a trial of the President but of a private citizen.”10
The problem with Senator Paul’s argument is that it confuses
impeachment with trial. It may very well be that the House of
Representatives can only impeach the officers listed in Article II, Section
4, namely the President, Vice President, and other civil officers—and not
private citizens, including ex-Presidents. But on January 13, 2021, the day
the House voted to impeach him, Donald Trump was President of the
United States, and fully subject to impeachment. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the impeachment itself was timely. The question was
whether the Senate could try the impeachment. The answer to that
question is found in the first sentence of Article I, Section 3, Clause 6,
which Senator Paul omitted to quote. That sentence reads: “The Senate
shall have the sole power to try all Impeachments.” As that sentence
makes clear, the Senate has power to try not just some impeachments but
“all” impeachments—presumably meaning all jurisdictionally proper
impeachments, which the Trump impeachment was. Article I contains no
hint of an implied limitation to cases where the officer is still in office at
the time of trial. True, if the January 13 impeachment had been
jurisdictionally improper, it would be reasonable for senators to say that it
was not truly an “impeachment” within the meaning of the Constitution,

8

David Smith, Boost for Trump as 45 Republican senators vote to dismiss
impeachment,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
26,
2021,
4:38
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/26/trump-impeachmentrepublicans-senate-vote-to-dismiss [https://perma.cc/Z558-WNQQ].
9
167 Cong. Rec. 142 (2021).
10
Id.
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and therefore that it should be dismissed. But given that the January 13
impeachment was procedurally impeccable – at least with respect to the
late impeachment issue – it is inescapable that the Senate had power to try
it. The relevant constitutional text is unambiguous.
That Chief Justice Roberts did not preside is beside the point. The
trial was not a trial of “the President,” but as Senator Paul said, of a private
citizen. But since the impeachment was of a sitting President and the
Senate’s jurisdiction extends to all jurisdictionally proper impeachments,
the private status of Mr. Trump at the time of trial affected nothing other
than who would preside.
Some may argue that Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 is worded as it is
(“sole power” to try “all impeachments”) solely to make clear that no body
other than the Senate has the power to try any impeachment. But even so,
it is baffling why anyone would interpret the words of the Clause as
barring senatorial action on a procedurally proper House impeachment.
Since the Senate has “sole power” to try all impeachments, surely it has
“power” to try all impeachments. Any limitation on the Senate’s express
power to try “all impeachments” must come from somewhere. It does not
come from the constitutional text.
Senator Paul may have been suggesting that trial of an ex-officer is
unconstitutional because such a person could not be removed from office,
making a trial pointless. Majority Leader Charles Schumer responded to
that argument, quoting Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, which permits the
Senate to disqualify a person convicted on impeachment from future
office. He drew the conclusion: “If the Framers intended impeachment to
merely be a vehicle to remove sitting officials from their office, they would
not have included that additional provision: disqualification from future
office.”11 To be sure, sitting officers convicted on impeachment must be
removed, but any person convicted on impeachment may be disqualified
from future office. There is no textual or logical reason to assume that
only a person who can be removed can be tried and convicted.
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, therefore, Senator Paul’s
point of order was not meritorious. The Senate has power to try “all
impeachments,” and the Trump impeachment had taken place, properly,
while he was still in office. While he could no longer be removed, he
could be disqualified from future office, which would be a serious and
consequential sanction.
To be sure, the senators’ vote on the issue was final. Because the
Senate has the “sole Power to try all Impeachments,”12 no power in heaven
or on earth could have overruled the Senate if a majority had voted to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, however erroneous such a decision might
seem. Moreover, the vote would presumably have established a precedent,
11
12

Id.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 6.
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which would guide future cases to the extent that legislative precedents
ever do so. But senators are “on Oath or Affirmation” when trying an
impeachment,13 and thus on the highest possible obligation to put aside
partisan considerations. It is difficult to see any sound legal basis for an
affirmative vote on the point of order.
There is a wrinkle, however. The Trump lawyers argued that an
impeachment, technically, occurs not when the House passes its resolution
of impeachment but when House managers deliver the impeachment to the
Senate.14 They based this argument on a historical practice that ceased
some 110 years ago.15 Both in Britain and in Congress prior to 1912, the
lower house would typically enact a resolution stating that the named
officer “be impeached” and authorizing its managers to go to the upper
house and “impeach” the officer before the bar of the Senate. Only later
would the House adopt specific articles of impeachment.16 Under this
practice, it may be argued that the impeachment technically did not occur
when the House voted the resolution but when the managers appeared
before the Senate. In the Trump case, for reasons unknown, the House
managers did not convey the impeachment to the Senate until January 25,
five days after Mr. Trump left office.17 The Trump lawyers thus argued
that “Mr. Trump was no longer President at the time the House filed the
Article of Impeachment in the Senate.”18 Whatever the merits of this
argument under past practice, however, the modern practice has changed.
On January 13, consistent with House impeachment practice since 1912,
the House passed a resolution stating unequivocally “[t]hat Donald John
Trump, President of the United States, is impeached for high crimes and
misdemeanors.”19 Not that House managers should go to the Senate at
some point in the future and “impeach” him there—but that he “is”
13

Id.
TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF DONALD J. TRUMP, 45TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, S. DOC. NO.117–2, at 141–46 (1st Sess. 2021) [hereinafter
TRUMP TRIAL MEMORANDUM].
15
See generally Mary L. Volcansek, British Antecedents for U.S. Impeachment
Practices: Continuity and Change, 14 THE JUST. SYS. J. 40 (1990).
16
Id.; The procedure is described by JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 805 (1833). See, e.g., Journal of the House
of Representatives, 5th Cong., 1st Sess. 72–73 (July 7, 1797). The form of impeachment
was a resolution that “A member go to the Senate, and at the bar of that House,
impeach [name of officer], in the name of this House and of the people of the United
States; and to inform them that they will, in due time, exhibit articles of impeachment
against him, and make good the same.” It appears that the function of this form of
resolution was to enable the Senate to take steps to secure the presence of the accused.
See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 805 (1833).
17
See Herb, supra note 6; see also H.R.J Res. 24, 177th Cong. (2021).
18
TRUMP TRIAL MEMORANDUM , supra note 14, at 141.
19
H.R.J Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).
14
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impeached as of passage of the resolution. This manner of proceeding
gives no legal significance to the timing of the managers’ presentation of
the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
There is no reason to think that the old practice, which was not
constitutionally mandated, truncates the current powers of the House of
Representatives to decide when and how to carry out its impeachment
function. Each house of Congress has control over its own procedures,20
and the House of Representatives determined that Mr. Trump “is
impeached” as of January 13. That seems conclusive. Moreover, it is far
from clear that even the old practice would have led to a different
conclusion as to the operative legal date of impeachment. Article II,
Section 2, Clause 5 states that the "House of Representatives . . . shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment,” indicating that impeachment must be an
act of the House, and of no one else.21 An impeachment resolution is
passed by the whole House; presentation of the impeachment to the Senate
is done by the House managers. It would be odd to say that impeachment
takes place when the managers act, rather than when the House acts. In
any event, since 1912, the date of delivery of the Article of Impeachment
to the Senate has had no constitutional significance, if it ever did.
The constitutional text thus does not limit the trial of an impeachment
to current officeholders. Nor can such a limitation be derived from history,
practice or precedent. The drafting and ratification history contain no hints
one way or the other. As will be seen below, prior history under British
and early state practice allowed impeachment (not just trial) of officers
after they left office; that history lends no support to the claim that the
Senate’s power to try an impeachment ends when the officer leaves office.
On the few occasions when the issue has arisen in practice, the Senate
has concluded that it had power to try a timely impeachment, even after
the officer resigned or otherwise left office. The clearest instance was the
impeachment of Judge George English in 1926 for a variety of judicial
misdeeds.22 After his impeachment by the House, but six days before his
trial by the Senate, Judge English resigned.23 The House managers

20
See N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 550 (2014) (relying on the
“broad delegation of authority” to each House to determine the nature of its
proceedings); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993) (relying on the words
“sole authority” to hold that the courts may not interfere with the Senate’s chosen
procedure in cases of impeachment).
21
The leading legal dictionary of the day defined the term “impeachment” as the
“Accusation and Prosecution of a Person for Treason, or other Crimes and
Misdemeanors.” G. JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (London 1729). This implies
that the House is constitutionally vested not only with the power to initiate the
proceedings but also to conduct the prosecution before the bar of the Senate.
22
U.S. SENATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE TRIAL OF
IMPEACHMENT OF GEORGE W. ENGLISH, S. DOC. No. 69–177 (1926).
23
Id. at 78.
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recommended termination of the proceedings but informed the Senate that
“the resignation of Judge English in no way affects the right of the Senate,
sitting as a court of impeachment, to hear and determine” the case.24
Senators then voted to dismiss the case, 70-9, but all those who spoke up
expressed the view that the body retained jurisdiction.25 In the 1796
Blount impeachment, discussed in the next section, the Senate dismissed
an impeachment where the target, a Senator, had been expelled from office
after impeachment but before the House had adopted specific articles of
impeachment, and before the Senate began the trial.26 However, no
discernible precedent was set on the question of the triability of former
officers, because the principal issue at stake in the dismissal motion was
that members of Congress are not “civil Officers of the United States”
within the meaning of Article II, Section 4 and thus could not be
impeached in the first place.27 Moreover, although the House manager
correctly distinguished between late impeachments and the trial of cases
after the official was no longer in office, Blount’s representatives in the
Senate debate discussed the case as if it involved a late impeachment,28
which it was not, as did some of the senators. Late impeachments and
trials of timely impeachments after the target has left officer are different
issues.29
There are no serious functionalist arguments against the trial of an
ex-officer on a timely impeachment. The Trump lawyers’ brief argued
that this would set a bad precedent, but they did not distinguish between
trials of impeachments and impeachments themselves. Their brief called
late impeachments “a dangerous slippery slope that the Senate should be
careful to avoid,” suggesting that “a future House could impeach former
Vice President Biden for his obstruction of justice in setting up the Russia
hoax circa 2016” or “former Secretary of State Clinton for her violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 793.”30 But these examples were hypothetical late
impeachments, not trials of timely impeachments. If the impeachment
power is limited to current officers, there will be no possibility of reaching
back to long-out-of-office targets.
Maybe the motion to dismiss the Trump impeachment was an
exercise of the Senate’s discretion not to spend time on the matter—
analogous to the Supreme Court’s discretionary power to deny certiorari,
or to dismiss as improvidently granted. Article I, Section 8, Clause 6 gives

24

68 CONG. REC. 297 (1926) (report submitted by Rep. Michener).
S. DOC. NO. 69–177, at 92–93; For facts and citations regarding the English
impeachment, see Kalt, supra note 2, at 104–05.
26
See infra Part III.C.
27
See Kalt, supra note 2, at 89.
28
See id. at 88.
29
For facts and citations regarding the Blount impeachment, see id. at 86–89.
30
TRUMP TRIAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 14, at 144.
25
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the Senate “sole power” to try impeachments but does not impose a duty
on the upper house to act.31 This would explain how forty-five senators,
under oath, could vote not to exercise jurisdiction.32 That is not, however,
what the motion on which they voted said. The motion declared that the
proceeding before the Senate “violates the Constitution and is not in
order.” The Trump lawyers’ brief said clearly that the Senate “lacks
jurisdiction”33—not that the Senate has discretion to duck. No senator
made the discretion argument during floor debate, but one Senator, Ted
Cruz of Texas, did so in an op-ed.34

III. MAY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IMPEACH FORMER
OFFICERS AFTER THEY HAVE LEFT OFFICE?
The second question raised by the 2021 Trump impeachment is more
difficult: Does the House of Representatives have power to impeach
former officers after they are no longer in office? As it happens, this
question had no application to the Trump impeachment itself, because he
was impeached six days before the end of his term. But the question was
much discussed in connection with his trial and was the focus of the Trial
Memorandum of the House managers as well as the “Replication” (or legal
response) of Mr. Trump’s lawyers in the Senate. Almost every Republican
senator who voted against conviction relied on this argument rather than
attempting to justify or excuse Mr. Trump’s actions in the aftermath of the
election of 2020.35
Scholars who have written on the question all seem to conclude that
former officials are impeachable,36 but I maintain that the better

31
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. I do not mean to imply that it would be
appropriate for the Senate to decline to act on a procedurally proper impeachment. At
the very least, this would indicate a lack of comity toward the other branch. My point
is just that the Senate has no constitutional duty to try impeachments under the text of
Article I.
32
167 CONG. REC. S142–43 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2021).
33
TRUMP TRIAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 14, at 183.
34
Sen. Ted Cruz, Should the Senate exercise jurisdiction over Trump's
impeachment trial? Why the answer matters, FOX NEWS (Feb. 9, 2021, 10:30 PM),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/ted-cruz-senate-jurisdiction-trump-impeachmenttrial [https://perma.cc/JF4K-8TYF].
35
See Levine & Gambino, Donald Trump Acquitted in Second Impeachment
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2021, 7:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/feb/13/donaldtrump-acquitted-impeachment-trial
[https://perma.cc/U7GH-VVMJ] (“[F]ew [Republican Senators] defended his actions
during the trial. Instead, they relied on a technical argument . . . that the proceedings
were unconstitutional because Trump was no longer in office.”).
36
GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 82; Bestor, supra note 2; Rotunda, supra note 2;
Kalt, supra note 2. To be sure, Gerhardt, Bestor, and Rotunda focus especially on
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interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions for impeachment is to the
contrary. I base this conclusion primarily on textual and structural
grounds. The contrary interpretation is usually based primarily on the
functionalist argument that late impeachment may be necessary to deter
misconduct during a President’s final weeks in office. It also claims
support from pre-constitutional practice in Britain and the early states, and
an ambiguous impeachment in the late nineteenth century. In my view,
the functionalist argument is cancelled out by an equal-but-opposite
functionalist argument that the House should not be able to engage in
political harassment of prior officers when the partisan winds shift. Text
and structure, informed by history, provide a consistent rule for all cases.

A. Text and Structure
The Constitution’s four clauses bearing on impeachment are divided
logically between Articles I and II. Article II, which governs the executive
branch, sets forth how the President and other civil officers are chosen and
how they may be removed—including by impeachment. Section 4
contains a list of impeachable persons and the offenses for which they may
be impeached, and mandates removal of officers after conviction. At the
Philadelphia Convention, the precursor to Article II, Section 4, was first
introduced and always discussed in connection with the presidential term
of office. Because they were contemplating what seemed to them a long
term – four years or maybe longer – the delegates concluded that there had
to be a means of removing a president for malfeasance in office. For much
of the summer, the draft constitution specified the grounds for
impeachment but was silent about the procedures, and impeachment
applied only to the President.37 Article I, which governs the legislative
branch, addresses the congressional role in impeachment and trial. It
assigns the “sole Power of Impeachment” to the House of Representatives
and the “sole Power to try all Impeachments” to the Senate. These
provisions follow the British parliamentary model under which the House
of Commons had the power of impeachment and the House of Lords had
the power to try all impeachments. In a departure from the British model,
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 makes clear that the Senate may not impose
punishments other than “removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”
This clause was originally located among the provisions of what is now
Article III, governing the federal judiciary, and was moved to Article I,
impeachability after the officer has a resigned, but their textual/structural arguments
are not so limited.
37
The impeachment provision was added very early in the Convention, on June
2. It read, in its entirety, that the executive was to be “removable on impeachment &
conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty.” 1 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 78 (journal), 88 (Madison’s notes).
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Section 3 when the power to try impeachments was shifted from the
Supreme Court to the Senate.38
Article II, Section 4 is the only part of the Constitution that speaks to
who may be impeached, or the proper grounds for impeachment. It
provides that “[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”39 The provision does not, by its words, extend to persons
who are not serving as officers. The United States has only one
“President” and one “Vice President” at a time. Ex-presidents do not
count. After January 20, 2020, Donald J. Trump was no longer the
President of the United States. He was a private citizen.
The context strongly indicates that the lists of impeachable officers
and offenses in Article II, Section 4 are exclusive—that the President, Vice
President, and civil officers are the only persons subject to impeachment,
and that treason, bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors are the only
charges under which impeachment may be brought. For most of the
Constitutional Convention, only the President was subject to
impeachment. Just a week before the end of the Convention, the delegates
voted to make “the vice-President and other civil Officers of the U.S.” also
subject to impeachment and removal.40 It seems clear that, without this
amendment, these officers would not have been impeachable. It follows
that after the amendment, no one other than these officers and the President
could be impeached—thus excluding private persons, military officers,
members of Congress, and state government officials. The entire
discussion proceeded on the implicit assumption that to render a party
subject to impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate, that party
must be listed in what is now Article II, Section 4. Similarly, the term
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors” was added to Article II, Section 4 in the
final week of the Convention for the explicit reason that treason and
bribery would otherwise be the only bases for impeachment and removal.41
In both respects, these were departures from the British model. The
House of Commons could impeach anyone (other than a Royal), including
former officers and private persons, and it was not limited as to the charges
it could bring (except that private persons could be impeached only for
public offenses, not private wrongs). In 1681, the House of Commons
resolved: “That it is the undoubted right of the Commons, in parliament

38

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. II, § 4, cl. 6; id. art. II, § 3,
cl. 7; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 180 (Comm. of Detail
draft) (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
39
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
40
2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 546 (journal), 552
(Madison’s notes).
41
Id. at 550.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/11

12

McConnell: Impeachment and Trial After Officials Leave Office

2022]

IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL

805

assembled, to impeach before the Lords in Parliament, any peer or
Commoner for treason or any other crime or misdemeanor.”42 History
provides numerous examples. In a notorious case surely known to the
framers, Parliament impeached, convicted, and punished Dr. Henry
Sacheverell, a flamboyant preacher, for a seditious sermon.43 The House
of Commons also impeached the former Governor General of Bengal,
Warren Hastings, an instance mentioned during the Convention,44 and
several of Queen Anne’s former ministers after her death and a change in
government. In the latter instance, the impeachable conduct was the
negotiation of a bad treaty.45 Other ministers were impeached for giving
pernicious advice to the monarch.46 The framers evidently did not want to
subject private citizens to impeachment; nor did they wish to create an
open-ended set of impeachable offenses, which would effectively make
the President serve “at the pleasure of the Senate.”47 Gouverneur Morris,
a leading delegate and principal author of the final constitutional text,
stated explicitly that “corruption & some few other offences to be such as
ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated &
defined.”48
The possibility that former Presidents might be impeachable after
leaving office was never raised or debated at the Philadelphia Convention.
To the contrary, the only relevant debate was over the dangers and benefits
of impeaching and removing a President “whilst in office.” Some
delegates opposed this because it would make the executive “dependent
on those who are to impeach,” which would “effectually destroy his
independence.” A larger number insisted it was “indispensable that some
provision should be made for defending the Community agst the
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate” and that the need
to face the public periodically for reelection “was not a sufficient

42
8 STATE TRIALS 223, 236-37 (Howell 1681). See also J. Selden, OF THE
JUDICATURE IN PARLIAMENTS 6 (1690); 4 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *259.
43
The Sacheverell impeachment was widely seen as an abuse of power by the
Whig government, and led to riots and a victory for the Tory party in the next election.
See generally GEOFFREY HOLMES, THE TRIAL OF DOCTOR SACHEVERELL (Eyre
Methuen 1973).
44
See MITHI MUKHERJEE, INDIA IN THE SHADOWS OF EMPIRE: A LEGAL AND
POLITICAL HISTORY 1-44 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); see FARRAND, supra note 40, at
550.
45
See FRANK O. BOWMAN, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF
IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 38 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019).
46
See Raoul Berger, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 71 & n.91
(1973) (giving six examples).
47
See FARRAND, supra note 40, at 550.
48
Id. at 65.
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security.”49 Some scholars invoke this debate as proof that “most members
took it for granted that the President would be impeachable after he left
office,”50 but this interpretation is unwarranted. The member who opposed
impeachability of the President “whilst in office” moved to “strike out”
the impeachment clause altogether. Apparently, it did not occur to any
participant in the debate that after-office impeachment was a plausible
option.
To interpret Article II, Section 4 as allowing impeachment of former
officers requires us to interpret the clause as non-exclusive. And indeed,
that is how most scholars supporting the impeachability of past officers
read the clause. They point out that the literal language of Article II,
Section 4 does nothing more than make mandatory the penalty of removal
from office in a certain category of cases. As Professor Michael Gerhardt,
a respected scholar and author of one of the leading books on
impeachment, explains: “Although Article II refers to ‘all civil officers of
the United States,’ this reference could mean only that those who are still
civil officers at the time of conviction must be removed.”51 According to
this interpretation, the House of Representatives is free to impeach
whomever it wishes, so long as the Senate complies with its Article II duty
to remove any sitting civil officer convicted for treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors.52
While not linguistically impossible, this “mandatory penalties only”
interpretation of Article II, Section 4 is highly implausible for a number of
reasons. First, this is not the way we ordinarily read lists of included items,
like the list of impeachable officers in Article II. The canon of
construction called expressio unius est exclusio alterius – to include one
thing is to exclude others – is commonly observed in constitutional
interpretation.53 When that canon applies, unlisted items similar in nature
to those on the list are excluded by negative implication. For example, if
the dean of a law school announces that second- and third-year law
students are eligible for a particular award, she is also saying that first-year
students are not. When the Constitution lists certain officers as subject to
impeachment and removal, this strongly suggests that other persons are
Id. at 64–69 (Madison’s Notes).
Bestor, supra note 2, endorsed by GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 82 n. 27.
51
GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 82; accord, Bestor, supra note 2; Rotunda, supra
note 2. To be sure, all three scholars are focused primarily on post-resignation
impeachments, which may present a special case, but their literal reading of Article II,
Section 4 is not limited to that special case.
52
Professor Gerhardt concedes that “it is clear and well settled that the
impeachment power does not extend to private persons,” but points to nothing in the
constitutional text that protects against that eventuality. GERHARDT, supra note 2, at
83.
53
See, e.g., Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969).
49
50
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not. While Article II, Section 4 could mean only that sitting officers are
subject to mandatory removal as well as the possibility of disqualification,
while other persons, if impeached and convicted, are subject merely to
disqualification, this is an odd way to put the point.54
Second, the interpretation would have implications far beyond the
impeachability of officers after they leave office, some of which are highly
unsettling. Under British Parliamentary practice, the House of Commons
could impeach even private citizens, if they committed offenses of a public
nature, such as sedition or bribery. The Constitution contains no other
clause that even arguably delimits the House of Representatives’
seemingly plenary power of impeachment. What is to keep the House
from impeaching whomever it wishes—understanding that, under Article
II, Section 4, removal from office would not be mandatory except for
Presidents, Vice Presidents, and other civil officers?55 If the non-exclusive
interpretation is correct, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the
House from impeaching private citizens (in violation of the due process
principles),56 military officers (undermining their right of court martial),
54
Professor Kalt agrees that the list of impeachable persons in Section 4 is
exclusive, but suggests that the provision focuses on the time of the misconduct, not
the time of impeachment or trial, as if Section 4 read: “The President, Vice President,
and all civil officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction
of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors committed during their
term of office.” See Kalt, supra note 2, at 58–60, 64–66. That is a reasonable position
from a pragmatic point of view, but it would be an awkward reading of the text. If
accepted, moreover, that view would preclude impeachment for conduct that took
place before the officer assumed office. Perhaps that is a reasonable limitation, but
history is against it. In 1879, a House committee reported articles of impeachment
against George Seward, the Minister to China, on account of alleged theft of public
funds in his former capacity as consul-general to Shanghai. 8 Cong. Rec. H2350–51
(Mar. 3, 1879). Although Seward ultimately was not impeached, the fact that his
misconduct preceded his office was not seen as an issue. The question of impeachment
for past misconduct became a lively subject of controversy when Republicans
considered impeaching President Clinton in connection with the Whitewater scandal,
which preceded his presidency. Less controversially, Vice President Agnew’s
acceptance of bribes as Governor of Maryland would likely have been regarded as
impeachable even if he had not continued to receive payments while Vice President.
Kalt’s best argument for this reading is the interpretation that has been given of Art.
I, Section 5, Cl. 2, under which two former members of Congress have been punished
for misbehavior while in office. Id. at 66. It is not clear, however that that
interpretation is correct or that it should be extended to other clauses.
55
Professor Kalt suggests, plausibly, that the term “impeachment” imparts some
limits. Kalt, supra note 2, at 65, But pre-constitutional Parliamentary practice allowed
“impeachment” of private citizens, and for a wide array of offenses.
56
It might be argued that impeachment and trial of private citizens would violate
the Bill of Attainder Clause, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3. But attainders and
impeachments are not the same thing. A bill of attainder is a legislative act, which
must be passed by both Houses of Congresses and presented to the President.
Impeachment is the act of the House of Representatives alone, and the trial of an
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members of Congress (despite other provisions addressing their
discipline), or state officials (to the detriment of federalism). All of these
results are contrary to consistent American practice. The list of
impeachable persons in Article II is thus better understood as a deliberate
rejection of the British practice, and a limitation of the “grand inquest of
the nation” to persons holding federal civil office.
The historical context also argues against the mandatory-penaltiesonly interpretation. Prior to the last week of the Constitutional
Convention, the only person subject to impeachment was the President.
On September 8, the delegates voted unanimously to expand the universe
of who may be impeached to include the Vice President and all other civil
officers. No delegate suggested that these other officers were already
impeachable, and the context of the debate makes that highly unlikely.
Certainly there was no hint that the only significance of Section 4 was to
make the removal penalty mandatory in a subset of cases rather than to
specify who may be impeached.
Moreover, if the list of impeachable officers in Section 4 is not
exclusive, it would follow that the list of impeachable offenses is not
exclusive, either. The argument would be that Article II, Section 4 makes
the penalty of removal mandatory in cases of treason, bribery, and other
high crimes and misdemeanors, but otherwise does not limit the plenary
authority of the House to impeach its targets for whatever offenses it
wishes.57 This would make all our arguments over the meaning of “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” pointless. Moreover, the history here is
explicit. In the days up to September 8, the relevant article allowed
impeachment only for treason and bribery. George Mason moved to add
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors” precisely because he did not wish
impeachment and removal to be “restrained” to those two grounds.58
Thus, we know that the framers regarded the list of offenses in Article II,
Section 4 as exclusive. There is no reason to read the list of impeachable
persons any differently.
Fifth, the exclusive interpretation of Article II, Section 4 best
comports with the general structure of the Constitution, under which
congressional, powers are enumerated, with all other powers left to the
states. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist, No. 45, “The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined.”59 No authority is given to the House, anywhere in the
Constitution, to impeach former officers. Because the framers explicitly

impeachment is an act of the Senate alone. It would not be precise to describe the acts
of single house as bills.
57
This is not a straw man. See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential
Immunity from Judicial Process, 29 YALE L. & POL. REV. 53, 62–77 (1999).
58
See FARRAND, supra note 40, at 550.
59
THE FEDERALIST, NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison).
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gave the House power to impeach the President and other civil officers, it
would be odd to assume that the House already had power to impeach
former presidents and former officials, derived from a catch-all source of
power like Article I, Section 2, Clause 5.
Finally, it bears mention that Madison, writing in The Federalist, No.
39, stated: “The President of the United States is impeachable at any time
during his continuance in office.”60 Madison did not suggest that the
President might also be amenable to impeachment after his term had ended
and he returned to private life.61
I am not persuaded by one other textual argument against impeaching
former officers. Former President Trump’s lawyers argued in their 2021
legal brief that only sitting officers may be impeached, because only sitting
officers can be removed.62 Ah, but former officers convicted on
impeachment may suffer the punishment of disqualification from future
office. They may be disqualified from appointment to the courts (as
former President Taft was), from serving in Congress (as former
Presidents John Quincy Adams and Andrew Johnson were),63 or from
serving in the cabinet (as has not yet happened, but could). The
Constitution carefully declares that sitting officers must be removed, but
it leaves open the possibility of conviction followed by disqualification
from future office.

B. Pre-Constitutional and Drafting History
Pre-constitutional British practice was replete with impeachment and
conviction of former officers. Indeed, at the very time the Constitution
was being written and ratified, Edmund Burke – beloved of the Americans
60

THE FEDERALIST, NO. 65, at 242 (James Madison).
Later, in the House of Representatives, Madison stated, “Where the people are
disposed to give so great an elevation to one of their fellow citizens, I own that I am
not afraid to place my confidence in him; especially when I know he is impeachable
for any crime or misdemeanor, before the senate, at all times; and that at all events he
is impeachable before the community at large every four years, and liable to be
displaced if his conduct shall have given umbrage during the time he has been in
office.” CONG. REC., 1st Cong. 458 (emphasis added). It has been suggested that the
italicized words “at all times” mean that the President could be impeached after
leaving office, but there is no reason to think that was Madison’s point. I am grateful
to Professor Seth Barrett Tillman for bringing this statement to my attention.
62
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 283 (1833).
63
The question is beyond the scope of this Article, but Article II, Section 3,
Clause 7 may not extend to disqualification from Congress. There is a plausible
argument that “Offices of honor, trust or profit under the United States” comprise only
appointed, not elected, offices. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Who Can Be President of the
United States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem of Statutory
Qualifications, 5 BRIT. J. OF AM. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2016).
61
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for his support during the struggle for independence – was engaged in
prosecuting the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the former Governor
General of Bengal (British India) for abuses of power he committed in that
capacity.64 The Hastings impeachment was specifically cited during the
Constitutional Convention—though on the issue of proper grounds for
impeachment, not on the issue of late impeachments.65
Pre-constitutional British practice is usually an important source for
constitutional understanding,66 but not when there is evidence that the
framers departed from the British model. Here, the framers evidently did
so. If we followed British practice, impeachment would extend to all
citizens (with the possible exception of members of Congress, whose
punishment is dealt with separately), the grounds for impeachment and
conviction would be broader, and the punishment upon conviction would
be criminal in character. Our system has rejected all of that. There is no
logical reason to pluck out one aspect of British practice – late
impeachment – and give it weight, when we have rejected most of the rest.
The evidence from early state constitutions is intriguing, but
ultimately inconclusive. Eleven of the thirteen states, plus Vermont, had
enacted state constitutions as of the federal convention in 1787.67 Ten of
these had provisions for impeachment:
•

Six states authorized impeachment of “officers of the state” (using
a variety of terms).68 The most natural reading of these provisions
is that they applied only to current officials. Former officers are
not “officers”; they are private citizens. Unlike Article II, Section
4, these provisions are not susceptible to the mandatory-penaltiesonly interpretation. Moreover, there is no evidence that these
states ever impeached officials after they left office.

•

Two states, Virginia and Delaware, permitted impeaching the
governor only after “he is out of office.”69 The most famous
application of this provision was the 1781 impeachment inquiry
into the conduct of former Governor Thomas Jefferson in

Conor Cruise O’Brien, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY OF
EDMUND BURKE (1992).
65
See FARRAND, supra note 40, at 550.
66
In the first impeachment, members of Congress treated Parliamentary practice
as authoritative where the Constitution did not depart. See Journal of the House of
Representatives, 5th Cong., 1st. Sess. History of Congress 459–460 (July 7, 1797).
67
See State Constitutions, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/ktca/liberty/
popup_stateconst.html [https://perma.cc/YA54-CNHD] (last visited May 26, 2020).
68
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, (Max Farrand eds.,
Yale University Press, vol. 2, 1911).
69
See The First Virginia Constitution, US History.org: The Declaration of
Independence,
https://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/vaconst.html
[https://perma.cc/YY7P-4RTT] (last visited May 25, 2022).
64
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connection with his conduct of the war. (Jefferson was cleared of
wrongdoing). Both states authorized the infliction of “pains and
penalties,” i.e., criminal punishment, against a convicted offender
in addition to dismissal from office.70
•

Delaware provided that any impeachment of the governor had to
be within eighteen months of his departure from office.71 That
statute of limitations preserved the purpose of late impeachment,
namely deterrence of wrongdoing in the late days of an
administration, while avoiding the principal danger of late
impeachments, which is politically-motivated harassment of
former officials when the political tides have turned. It may have
been the best solution to the problem of late-in-office misconduct,
but it was not imitated by any other state or by the framers of the
Constitution.

•

Pennsylvania and Vermont allowed impeachment of the chief
executive “either when in office, or after his resignation, or
removal for mal-administration.”72
They did not allow
impeachment of officers after they had served out their terms. 73
This allowed impeachment to proceed in the circumstances where
the governor’s conduct likely precipitated his termination but
forbade the impeachment of former governors in the normal case.
This, too, was an attractive solution—but, like the Delaware
solution, was not imitated by other states or the framers.

•

All four states that expressly allowed impeachment of former
officers also allowed impeachment of private persons who
committed offenses against the state, such as treason or bribery,
but not private crimes such as theft of private property or assault
on a private person.74

From the existence of these conflicting provisions, we know that the
question of impeachment of former officers was on the minds of the
drafters of the state constitutions and that there was no consensus about
70

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 68.
See Constitution of Delaware; 1776, YALE L. SCHOOL: THE AVALON PROJECT,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/de02.asp
[https://perma.cc/9JV3-N97P]
(last visited May 25, 2022).
72
See Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, PENN. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM
COMM’N, http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/documents/1776-1865/
pennsylvania-constitution-1776.html [https://perma.cc/53UX-JX6S] (last visited May
26, 2022).
73
See id.
74
See Art. II.S4.4.2 Historical Background, CONST. ANN.,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artII-S4-2-2/ALDE_00000699/
[https://perma.cc/C49S-MGFK] (last visited May 26, 2022).
71
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the answer. The provisions also suggest a pattern. Roughly speaking, the
states divided into two camps. Six saw impeachment as a means of
removing “the Governor and other Officers offending against the State, by
violating any Part of this Constitution” (in the words of the North Carolina
constitution).75 These applied impeachment to sitting officers. Four saw
impeachment as the vehicle for punishment of anyone who offended
against the state, whether they were in public office or not.76 These
extended impeachment to former officers.
At the Philadelphia Convention, there was a hint of the same divide.
Charles Pinckney opposed impeachment of the president “whilst in
office,” on the ground that this would destroy the president’s independence
from the legislative branch—which was one of the structural fundamentals
of the Constitution.77 Other delegates insisted on the “necessity of making
the Executive impeachable while in office,” especially in light of the long
term being contemplated, relative to state governors, most of whom served
for one-year terms.78 This consideration caused one influential delegate,
Gouverneur Morris, who had initially opposed impeachment of the
president for reasons similar to Pinckney’s, to change his position.79 In
the end, the framers opted for removal and forbade any punishments other
than removal and disqualification. In The Federalist, No. 39, Madison
called attention to the difference between the federal provision and that of
Virginia and Delaware,
“[i]n several of the States, however, no explicit provision is made for
the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and
Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the
United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in
office.”80

The pre-constitutional history is thus mildly supportive of the
position that former officers cannot be impeached. In British practice,
former officers could be impeached—but so could private citizens. There
is no reason to think the framers accepted one feature of British
impeachment practice and rejected most of the rest. The practice in the

75
See Constitution of North Carolina: December 18, 1776, YALE L. SCHOOL
LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIB., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp
[https://perma.cc/CX8Z-HZ6J] (last visited May 26, 2022).
76
See Art. II.S4.4.2 Historical Background, supra note 74.
77
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 supra note 68, at 64–65.
78
Id.
79
All quotes in this paragraph are from 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 64–65; see also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT
WHO WOULD NOT BE KING: EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 57–59
(Princeton Univ. Press 2020).
80
THE FEDERALIST, NO. 39, at 242 (James Madison).
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states was mixed, but the pattern was that those states that allowed
impeachment of former officials also allowed impeachment of private
persons for public offenses, while those that disallowed impeachment of
private persons also limited impeachment of former officials. The
Constitution most closely resembles the latter practice.

C. Congressional Practice Since 1787
Longstanding and consistent congressional practice can resolve
ambiguities in constitutional meaning,81 but congressional practice in
connection with late impeachments is far too scant to undermine the
textual and historical arguments outlined in the preceding subsections.
Prior to the second Trump impeachment, the question of impeachment of
a former officer came up only twice.
In 1797, Tennessee Senator William Blount, who had been a North
Carolina delegate to the Constitutional Convention, was accused of
plotting with the British to take over parts of the Spanish domains in North
America.82 The House of Representatives impeached him on July 7,
1797,83 and the Senate expelled him the next day84 under its Article I,
Section 5, Clause 2 power to discipline and expel its own members.85 In
those days, it was common for the House to vote impeachment but not to
adopt specific articles of impeachment until later. The House voted
articles of impeachment in January 1798,86 and the Senate opened a trial
on the impeachment in December 1798.87 Blount’s representatives moved
to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that senators are not civil officers subject
to impeachment, and (2) that Blount was no longer in office when the
House adopted the articles of impeachment.88 The Senate dismissed the
case for want of jurisdiction by a vote of 14-11; the motion to dismiss did
not distinguish between the two grounds.89 The late impeachment

81

E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014).
Kalt, supra note 2, at 86.
83
3 J. OF THE HOUSE OF REP, 5th Cong., 1st Sess. 72–73 (July 7, 1797).
Specifically, the House “resolved” that Blount “be impeached of high crimes and
misdemeanors,” and “ordered” that a House member “do go to the Senate, and, at the
bar thereof, in the name of the House of Representatives, and the people of the United
States, impeach William Blount, a Senator of the United States, of high crimes and
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argument was not well founded. Although there was much discussion of
late impeachments, Blount was still a senator when he was impeached on
July 7, 1797.90 As the House manager argued, there is no impediment to
trying a former officer if he was impeached while still in office.91 It seems
clear from the language of the House resolutions that Blount was
“impeached” on July 7, 1797, the day before he was expelled; the vote on
January 29, 1798 was merely to “exhibit” articles of impeachment to the
Senate. In any event, the question of timing was so intertwined with the
question of whether a member of Congress may be impeached that it is not
possible to be sure exactly what precedent the Senate set, if it set any
precedent at all.
More to the point was the 1876 impeachment of Secretary of War
William Belknap.92 Shortly after evidence implicated Belknap in a
kickback scheme involving western trading posts, the House of
Representatives initiated impeachment proceedings.93 Hoping to avoid the
embarrassment, Belknap tendered his resignation to President Ulysses S.
Grant, which Grant promptly accepted.94 After a brief debate over the
permissibility of impeaching an officer after his resignation, the House
unanimously voted to impeach Belknap.95 The Senate conducted an
extraordinary four-week debate over its power to try Belknap after his
resignation. A majority voted against dismissal.96 After a two-month trial
in which his guilt was amply established, but during which his supporters
continued to press the late impeachment jurisdictional issue, Belknap was
acquitted.97 The vote, 37 to convict and 25 to acquit, was five votes shy
of the necessary two-thirds. Only three of the senators voting to acquit
indicated that they thought he was innocent on the merits, while the
remaining twenty-two announced they voted not guilty because they
believed the Senate had no jurisdiction.98
Whether this episode should be seen as a precedent in favor of the
impeachability of former officials depends in part on whether we focus on
the motion to dismiss, which required a majority, or on the vote to acquit
or convict, which required two-thirds. More importantly, it hinges on the
special circumstance of a resignation made for the specific purpose of
90
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derailing the impeachment proceeding. A plausible argument can be made
that the target of an impeachment, who is a civil officer at the time the
impeachment inquiry begins, should not be able to unilaterally terminate
the case by resigning.99 Equity often carves out an exception to a general
rule when a party to wrongdoing seeks to terminate jurisdiction by his own
acts. It would not be implausible to apply a similar equitable rule to the
late impeachment question. A similar issue had arisen in connection with
the Blount impeachment in 1797-98, where the loss of office came from
Blount’s expulsion rather than his resignation. Even on the dubious
assumption that the Blount impeachment was late, the House manager
argued that “no subsequent event, grounded on the willful act, or caused
by the delinquency of the party, can vitiate or obstruct the proceeding.”100
The arguments in these two cases will recall the provisions of two States,
Pennsylvania and Vermont, which barred late impeachments in ordinary
cases but allowed them in the cases of resignation or removal.101
In the author’s view, the closely-divided vote in the Belknap matter
is insufficient to resolve the question of late impeachments for all time.
For one thing, it is evident that a large majority of the senators were voting
on the basis of partisan loyalties, as they almost always do in the context
of presidential impeachments. It is hard to see why partisan outcomes
should be given much interpretive weight. Second, although most of the
argumentation in 1876 was about late impeachments, at least some of the
votes were likely affected by the narrower question of what to do when an
officer resigns in the midst of the impeachment proceeding. Finally, the
history shows no consistent congressional course of conduct with respect
to late impeachments, only a single episode. The Senate’s vote not to
dismiss the Belknap impeachment counts as evidence in favor of late
impeachments, but it is not enough to overcome the arguments based on
text, structure, and founding-era history.
Professor Kalt reports that in every case other than Belknap, the
House “opted not to proceed” when the target of an impeachment resigned
before the impeachment vote.102 This is sensible because the principal
purpose of impeachment in most cases is to remove an unfit officer.
Resignation removes the need for the proceeding. The most famous such
instance was that of President Richard M. Nixon, who almost certainly
would have been impeached, and probably convicted and removed, if he

99
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had not resigned. The House’s practice of abandoning such impeachments
does not count as proof against the power of the House to impeach after a
resignation, however, because it could reflect an exercise of discretion.
Looking beyond actual impeachment proceedings, two eminent
nineteenth century statesmen-commentators took positions on the
impeachment of officers who were no longer in office. John Quincy
Adams, then a congressman, supported impeachment whenever the
misdeeds took place during the individual’s official service.103 Joseph
Story, in his Commentaries on the United States Constitution, argued
against the impeachability of former officials on the ground that they are
mere private citizens, and private citizens are not subject to
impeachment.104
Federal courts have not had occasion to consider whether former
officers may be impeached, but two state supreme courts have interpreted
state constitutional provisions similar to Article II, Section 4, as
disallowing the impeachment of former officials.105 One decision reached
the same conclusion as this Article, namely that the lower house could not
initiate impeachment against an officer once out of office, but the upper
house has authority to try such an officer if he or she had been validly
impeached.106 Moreover, a small bit of corroborating interpretation comes
from Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which provides that the Chief Justice
will preside “[w]hen the President of the United States is tried.” Chief
Justice John Roberts declined to preside at Mr. Trump’s February 2021
Senate trial, on the ground that the former president is not “the President.”
Assuming the Chief Justice was correct, it would seem to follow that a
former president also would not qualify for impeachment under the terms
of Article II, Section 4.

IV. CONCLUSION
In the last six days of his term, President Donald J. Trump was
impeached for his acts resisting the results of the 2020 presidential
election. He was tried by the Senate the next month, after he left office
and was a mere private citizen. Most of the forty-three Republican
senators who voted to acquit stated that they did so on procedural grounds
rather than the merits, namely, that officers cannot be impeached and tried
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STATES, § 283 (1833).
105
State v. Hill, 55 N.W. 794, 798 (Neb. 1893); Smith v. Brantley, 400 So. 2d
443, 451 (Fla. 1981).
106
Id.
104

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/11

24

McConnell: Impeachment and Trial After Officials Leave Office

2022]

IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL

817

after they are no longer in office.107 Whatever the tactical political
advantages of that position, it was wrong as a matter of constitutional law.
True, former officers very likely cannot be impeached, because they are
no longer “civil Officers of the United States.” But if properly impeached
by the House during their term of office, they can be tried by the Senate
even if they ceased to hold office in the meantime. This is because Article
I, Section 3, Clause 6 gives the Senate power to “try all Impeachments.”
Because Mr. Trump was impeached while he still was President, there is
no merit to the claim that he could not be tried. The senators who voted
to acquit on this ground confused the power to impeach, which is limited
to civil officers, with the power to try impeachments, which extends to
“all” impeachments properly voted by the House.

107
Levine & Gambino, supra note 35 (“[F]ew [Republican Senators] defended
his actions during the trial. Instead, they relied on a technical argument . . . that the
proceedings were unconstitutional because Trump was no longer in office.”).
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